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EDWARD J. ERLER24 
There can be little doubt that the central question confronting 
students of the Constitution has undergone a radical transformation 
in recent years. Pundits are fond of remarking that the Constitution 
has been taken out of constitutional law. Indeed, the main question 
agitated by constitutional scholars is no longer how the Constitution 
should be interpreted but whether it should be interpreted. The cur-
rent debate over constitutional interpretation divides the universe 
between "interpretivists" and "non-interpretivists." The use of 
these terms alone is almost sufficient evidence that constitutional 
studies have reached-if not their lowest point of declension-then 
certainly a very low point indeed. 
No clearer example can be found of how the Constitution has 
disappeared from constitutional debate than Justice William Bren-
nan's October 1985 speech at Georgetown University, entitled "The 
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification." 
His argument is a less sophisticated-and therefore more re-
vealing-version of the regnant orthodoxy shared by the leading ac-
ademic interpreters. Brennan scornfully rejects the argument that 
the Constitution must be understood in light of the intent of its 
framers as "facile historicism." The most that can be said in this 
regard is that "the Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity 
of man, a bold commitment by a people to the ideal of libertarian 
dignity protected through law." And since "the demands of human 
dignity will never cease to evolve," the Constitution itself must con-
tinually evolve to meet these new demands-demands that, for the 
most part, will be articulated by the courts. The courts thus serve 
as speech writers continually updating the "sublime oration" sym-
bolized-and only symbolized-by the Constitution. According to 
Brennan, the courts are best placed to spell out the progressive de-
mands of human dignity because-unlike the elected branches of 
government-the courts are not responsible to what Jesse Choper 
has termed the "self-absorbed and excited majoritarianism" that 
dominates the more political departments. 
There is, however, one "fixed and immutable" demand of 
"human dignity" that does not evolve-that "capital punishment is 
under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited 
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Curiously, the one 
"fixed and immutable" demand in the universe of otherwise con-
stantly evolving demands flies in the face of the literal language of 
24. Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, California State University, 
San Bernadino. 
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the Constitution itself.zs It is almost embarrassing to point out that 
the fifth amendment was ratified contemporaneously with the 
eighth. The fifth amendment not only refers to "capital or other-
wise infamous crime," but also provides that no person shall "be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
The clear meaning of the latter phrase is that with due process of law 
persons can be deprived of life.26 Since the only "immutable" point 
in Brennan's universe of constitutional values contradicts the clear 
and unequivocal language of the Constitution, we are forced, not 
indeed to ask the somewhat more sophisticated question of whether 
we have an unwritten constitution, but the much more simple-
minded one of whether we indeed have a written Constitution! 
Chief Justice Marshall noted in Marbury that Americans 
deemed "a written constitution" as "the greatest improvement on 
political institutions." The Constitution, Marshall continued, was 
an act of the "original right" of the people "to establish, for their 
future government, such principles, as, in their opinion, shall most 
conduce to their own happiness." This "is the basis on which the 
whole American fabric has been erected," and the "principles ... so 
established are deemed fundamental ... and are designed to be per-
manent." Thus, for Marshall, the Constitution, as a written decla-
ration of the people's "original right"-"a very great exertion; nor 
can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated"-to secure their 
safety and happiness, establishes the fundamental and permanent 
principles of constitutional government. A scholarship that takes 
constitutional government seriously must therefore be one which in-
tends to elaborate and apply those permanent and fundamental 
principles in the spirit of the "original and supreme will" of the 
people which established the Constitution. 
The Constitution is organic law and the attempt to translate it 
into an open-ended text which must continually evolve in response 
to the demands of various "interests" (albeit disguised as demands 
of "human dignity") will transform it into mere positive law. As 
25. Brennan prudently does not attempt to explain the unexplainable: how it is possible 
for one "fixed and immutable" point to exist in a universe of constant change and evolution. 
26. Brennan's argument is also vulnerable in terms of his own vision of human dignity. 
A nation that honors those who, by their actions, have demonstrated no regard for human 
dignity dishonors human dignity itself. If the Constitution stands for the ultimate human 
dignity of the individual, as Brennan insists, then according honor to those who refuse-by 
murder or other acts-to recognize the dignity of others would simply convert the Constitu-
tion into a "suicide pact." A true regime of human dignity honors those who demonstrate a 
regard for human dignity by honoring the laws and the Constitution and dishonors those who 
are either incapable or unwilling to recognize the human dignity or human rights of others. 
The test of humanity must surely be the mutual recognition of human dignity. 
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Lincoln argued in his debates with Douglas, a constitution based on 
interest is not a constitution of a free people. 
Constitutional scholarship, if it is to be serious scholarship, 
must be the scholarship of freedom. It must seek, above all, to elab-
orate the fundamental and permanent principles of the organic will 
of the people. The permanent principles of the Constitution must, 
of course, be adapted and applied in different ways in order to meet 
changing exigencies. But this adaptation and application does not 
alter or change the principles themselves. There must, therefore, be 
an element of statesmanship in constitutional studies if those studies 
are to serve constitutional government. But a scholarship that can-
not unashamedly serve the ends of constitutional government-
human freedom-does not deserve to be taken seriously. There is a 
real question as to whether the regnant scholarship of today de-
serves to be taken seriously. 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA27 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues .... 
-To Be Played Blues Style, Sung in a 
Bob Dylan Nasal Twang 
A distinguished professor of constitutional law, from one of the 
nation's best law schools, recently shared with me, in a candid mo-
ment over drinks at a conference, his thoughts on the current state 
of constitutional law scholarship. He was depressed about it, and 
he depressed me. I'm now in a constitutional crisis of my own. I 
suspect I was depressed primarily for two reasons: his diagnosis of 
the disease rang true, and I saw my own scholarship as dominated 
by its symptoms. 
So, I turn to my colleagues 
for what it's all about 
Please tell me, John Nowak, 
please lay it all out 
What were they really thinking, 
and why should we care? 
What should we be thinking, and 
where should we go from here? 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues! 
The discipline of constitutional law scholarship, it seems, has 
27. Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. 
